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IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]
Case No. 970117-CA
j
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i

Priority No. 2

CLINTON FERRIER,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant

appeals

his

conviction

for

possession

of

a

controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1996).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
and
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Must defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled
substance with intent

to distribute be reversed because, on

different facts, he was acquitted of simple possession?
When considering

an inconsistency

challenge to a jury's

verdicts, this Court will "review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict" and will "not overturn a jury's verdict
of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds could not rationally

have arrived at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based
on the law and on the evidence presented." State v. Berawerff, 777
P.2d 510, 511 (Utah App. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this appeal does not require the interpretation
of any statute, rule, or constitutional provision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In April 1996, defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a
controlled substance, possession of stolen property, and possession
of

drug paraphernalia

(R. 18-19).

possession-of-stolen-property

charge

The

court

at

trial

dismissed the
pursuant

defendant's motion for a directed verdict (R. 318-19).

to

Defendant

was subsequently convicted by a jury of possession with intent to
distribute and acquitted of possession of a controlled substance
and possession of paraphernalia (R. 122-24, 416) .

Defendant was

sentenced to the statutory term of one to fifteen years (R. 161).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 164).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 28, 1996, Officer Jim Eberling stopped a red Ford
pickup for having no license plates (R. 229). The driver, Charles
Lane, was arrested for driving on a suspended license; Lane's
passenger, Michelle Boyce, was released (R. 229-232).

2

Officer Eberling, assisted by Officer Rowley, performed an
inventory of the car before impounding it (R. 230, 232) .

The

officers discovered a small set of drug scales in the glove box and
a small bottle containing a liquid which they suspected was "acid"
(R. 230-31, 238, 247) .
While Officer Eberling took Lane to jail, Officer Rowley went
to Days Inn, where Boyce was staying, to investigate her connection
to the scales (R. 232-33, 247) .

Boyce and defendant were both

there; she consented to a search of the motel room (R. 247-48).
Officer Rowley discovered, among other things, a small propane
torch, a piece of tin foil, a snort tube, and a piece of glass from
a light bulb, all items commonly used for ingesting drugs (R. 24 9,
256).

He also uncovered three firearms and several rounds of

bullets, a wad of cash, and several small bags of methamphetamine
packaged for resale (R. 250-57, 261).
During the search, Officer Rowley also found two notes (R.
262).

One said: "Michelle, went with Clinton for a while. Things

are looking good, be back soon. Love You, Chuck." (id.). The note
had dollar signs written across it (id.). Defendant and Boyce were
both arrested for possession with intent to distribute (R. 261).
At defendant's trial, Charles Lane testified that he traveled
to Monticello from Farmington, New Mexico with defendant and Boyce
in order to sell drugs (R. 282, 308) . Defendant owed him money and

3

had informed him that they could make more money selling drugs in
Utah than in New Mexico (R. 282-83, 301).
Once in Monticello, the trio rented a motel room (R. 284,
308).

Lane

and

defendant

proceeded

to

methamphetamine (R. 284-86, 294, 309-10).

weigh

and

package

After they had "weighed

it up," they consumed what was left over (R. 287). Lane "snorted
it"; defendant smoked it by placing it on some glass from a broken
light bulb, holding a lighter under it, and inhaling the smoke
through a straw (R. 287-88).l
Lane then wrote the dollar-sign note to Michelle Boyce, who
was sleeping; its meaning, Lane testified, was that defendant would
be repaying him from the proceeds of drug sales the two of them
were going to complete (R. 292). Lane then accompanied defendant
while he made two drug transactions

(R. 289-91, 295) .

First,

defendant traded a "gram of dope" for a .357 Smith & Wesson at a
location which Lane believed to be defendant's step-sister's home
(R. 290, 298). Later in the day, defendant and Lane returned to
the

home

and

defendant

sold

his

step-sister

a

gram

of

methamphetamine for $80 (R. 291). Following these sales, defendant
paid Lane the money he owed him (R. 293-95, 311).2

1

This conduct formed the basis of the possession charge (R.
380-81).
2

This conduct formed the basis of the possession with intent
to distribute charge (R. 379-80).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his conviction for drug possession with
intent to distribute must be reversed because it is inconsistent
with his acquittal

on the drug possession

and paraphernalia

possession charges. This argument fails because (1) inconsistency
is not a ground for reversal; and (2) these verdicts were not
inconsistent, since the charges arose from different conduct.
ARGUMENT
INCONSISTENCY IS NOT A SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SET ASIDE A
JURY VERDICT AND, IN ANY EVENT, THESE VERDICTS WERE NOT
INCONSISTENT
Defendant claims that the jury's verdicts on the possessionwith-intent-to-distribute count (guilty) and the simple possession
and

possession

of

paraphernalia

counts

(not

guilty)

were

inconsistent and that this inconsistency raises a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt. See Br. Aplt. at 11. He further argues that both
counts rested on the testimony of the same witness, Charles Lane,
and that the jury could not rationally believe him as to one charge
and disbelieve him as to the others.
A.

Id.

A guilty verdict may not be attacked merely because it is
inconsistent with a not guilty verdict in the same trial.

It is well settled that "a criminal defendant convicted by a
jury on one count [can] not attack that conviction because it was
inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another
count."

United States v. Powell. 469 U.S. 57, 58 (1984) (citing

Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390
5

(1932)); accord State v.

Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986) ("the

inconsistency of

verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts
aside") (citations emitted); State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134
(Utah App.) (same), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
In some cases the evidence would seem logically to compel a
jury to convict on both charges or to acquit on both; a split
verdict creates a dilemma.

Defendants, of course, argue that the

acquittal proves that the jury disbelieved the critical evidence
and therefore that the conviction is unsupported by the evidence.
See, e.g.. Stewart, 729 P.2d at 614.
However, "[i]t is equally possible that the jury, convinced of
guilt, properly reached its conclusion on [one] offense, and then
through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent
conclusion on the [other] offense." Powell, 469 U.S. at 65; accord
Stewart, 729 P.2d at 614. Thus, "inconsistent verdicts in criminal
trials need not be set aside, but may instead be viewed as a
demonstration of the jury's leniency."

Powell, 469 U.S. at 61.

Although it of course has "no right to exercise" this power, a jury
"wish[ing] to avoid an all-or-nothing verdict" may assume it. Id.
at 66.
Although respecting inconsistent verdicts leaves the logical
tension unresolved, it is the fair result, since a defendant
convicted

on

a

split

verdict

may

attack

the

conviction

as

unsupported by the evidence, see, e.g.. State v. Bergwerff, 777

6

P.2d 510, 512 (Utah App. 1989), whereas a contrary resolution—
reconciling the verdicts by reversing the conviction—would leave
the government without recourse.
Accordingly,
inconsistency

defendant's

Powell. 469 U.S. at 65.
contention

that

"an

in the Jury's verdicts" provides

internal

a "basis for

reversal," Br. Aplt. at 11, fails as a matter of law.
B.

These verdicts were consistent.

Defendant's claim fails also as a matter of fact, since the
jury's

verdicts

were

defendant's argument

consistent.

The

unstated

premise

of

is that one who is not guilty of drug

possession cannot logically be guilty of possession with an intent
to distribute.

However, this apparent truism fails if the drugs

one is charged with possessing and the drugs one is charged with
distributing are different drugs.
Here they were.

The prosecutor asked the jury to convict

defendant of simple possession based on testimony that defendant
smoked methamphetamine in the motel room (see R. 287-88, 296, 310,
380-81) . He asked the jury to convict defendant of possession with
intent

to distribute based

on evidence that

defendant

later

delivered other methamphetamine to his step-sister (see R. 289-91,
295, 298, 379-80).

The prosecutor explained this clearly to the

jury in closing argument:
With regard to possession, how does [defendant]
possess drugs in this case? Well, he possesses the drugs
he was distributing, but we haven't charged him with the
two crimes — we haven't charged him with two crimes being
7

the same conduct. What did he possess in addition to
what he was distributing? He possessed the drugs he did
in the motel room with Mr. Lane . . . He possessed the
drugs that he consumed in the iightbulb, he possessed
the
drugs that he snorted in the snort tube.
That's
different than possession with intent to distribute.
That's why we have two charges.
(R. 380-81) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, since the different

verdicts were based on different conduct, they were factually
consistent.
Furthermore, that the charge on which defendant was convicted
and the charges on which he was acquitted all rested on the
testimony of Charles Lane does not create an inconsistency, as
defendant argues. See Br. Aplt. at 11. The jury may have believed
all of Lane's testimony and acquitted defendant on the possession
charges as an act of grace.
The jury also had the prerogative to believe part of Lane's
testimony and reject part: "It is elementary that the fact finder
may accept all, part, or none of a witness's testimony." Stewart,
729 P.2d at 612.

Accord State v. Haves. 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah

App. 1993) ("The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part
of any witness's

testimony.").3

Accordingly,

they may have

harbored a reasonable doubt as to the uncorroborated portions of
Lane's testimony.

3

In keeping with this principle, the jurors were instructed
that they were "not bound to believe all that the witnesses may
have testified to" (R. 367).

8

Lane's

testimony

that

defendant

smoked methamphetamine—

supporting the possession charge—was uncorroborated (see R. 28788, 310).

However, his testimony that defendant sold drugs—

supporting the intent to distribute charge—was corroborated by the
note that Lane had written to Michelle Boyce. That note indicated
that defendant participated in, or at least aided and abetted in,
the distribution of methamphetamine

(R. 292).4

In addition,

defendant's remarks to the officers during the motel room search
corroborated the distribution charge by demonstrating that he was
aware of some drugs in the motel room that had been packaged for
resale.5
There was, in sum, no inconsistency in these verdicts.
C.

The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of
possession with intent to distribute.

The bottom line here is that the evidence at trial, viewed "in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict," was not "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that a reasonable person
must have reasonably doubted [defendant's] guilt." Berawerff.

Ill

P.2d at 511-12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
4

The note stated: "Michelle, went with Clinton for a
while. Things are looking good, be back soon. Love you, Chuck."
(R. 262). The note also had dollar signs written across it (Id.)
5

Specifically, defendant identified one of Mr. Lane's bags
as a "marble bag" and stated it belonged to Lane (R. 263, 264,
275). Police felt the bag was used for distribution because it
contained drug paraphernalia, sandwich bags used for packaging
drugs, and several small bags of methamphetamine ready for sale
(R. 256-57, 261).
9

Charles Lane testified that he and defendant packaged some
methamphetamine for resale and that defendant delivered it to his
step-sister's home (see R. 284-86, 290-91, 294, 298, 309-10). This
testimony was corroborated by Lane's note (see R. 262) and by
defendant's

knowledge of other methamphetamine

that had been

similarly packaged for resale (see R. 263-64, 275). This evidence
was more than sufficient to convict.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this rz

10

day of October 1997.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to William L,
Schultz, Attorney for Appellant, 69 East Center Street, Moab,
Utah 84532, this

October 1997.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner, or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
or suffering;

(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through
(2XaXvii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.

Addendum B

SEVENTH DISTRICTCOURT
spn Juan County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128

RLE* APR 1 6 1996
CLERK Of-THE COURT

3/
IJEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

*

AMENDED
INFORMATION

vs.
CLINTON FERRIER
AKA: BENJAMINE
DOB: 12-6-72
4203 Terrace Drive
Farmington, NM 87401
Defendant.
•Officer: KENT ROWLEY

Criminal No. 9617-43

JIM EBERLING

The undersigned Complainant, CRAIG C. HALLS, under oath
states on information and belief that the Defendant(s) committed in
the above named County, the Crime(s) of:
COUNT No. 1:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE:
A FELONY OF THE 2nd DEGREE in
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i)(ii) and (iv),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the manner
as follows: That the said defendant on or about the
28TH day of MARCH 1996, did knowingly and
intentionally produce, manufacture, or dispense a
controlled substance, to wit: Methamphetamine, or
did
distribute
a controlled
or
counterfeit
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or did possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent it distribute.
COUNT No. 2:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE:
A Felony of
the 3rd degree, in violation of Section 58-378(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in
the manner as follows: That the said defendant on
or about the 28TH day of MARCH, 1996, did knowingly
and intentionally have in his possession controlled
substnces, to wit: Methamphetamine•

COUNT No. 3:
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY: A Felony of the 2nd
degree, in violation of Section 76-6-408, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the manner as
follows: That on or about the 28TH day of MARCH,
1996, said defendant did have in his possession
stolen property, to wit: a 357 firearm.
COUNT No. 4:
POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA: A Class B Misdemeanor,
in violation of Section 58-37a-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended in the manner as follows:
That the said defendant on or about the 28TH day of
MARCH,
1996, did
have
in
his
possession
paraphernalia used to plant, propagate, cultivate,
grow, manufacture, produce, process, prepare, store,
inhale, ingest, or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body.
Contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.

g C. Halls
Juan County Attorney
DATED: April 1, 1996
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Addendum C

San Juan County

DEC 1 0 1996

"LED

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY,

Deputy

In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan
County
State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

VERDICT

vs.
Clinton Ferrier,

Case No. 9617-43
Defendant.

We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled
case, do find the defendant, Clinton Ferrier, GUILTY of Count No..
1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.

DATED this

1A day of December, A.D., 1996.

Jvi<

&}*-+cJ *l*}* s

Clerk

By: Off^^fef-f^/v^r Deputy

SEVENTH DISTRIC1 COUfil
San Juan County
F,LED

DEC 1 Q 1996
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY.

Deputy

In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan
County
State of Utah
VERDICT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 9617-43

Clinton Ferrier,
Defendant.

We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled
case, do find the defendant, Clinton Ferrier, NOT GUILTY of Count
No. 2: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

DATED this JD

day of December, A.D., 1996

Foreperson
JO . 1996

4=2*-* JS<r('^4+fJ**'

By: Mf^a^ZT—

Clerk

W3*- Deputy

/W

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
nLED

DEC 1 0 1936
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY

Deputy

In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan
County
State of Utah
VERDICT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 9617-43

Clinton Ferrier,
Defendant.

We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled
case, do find the defendant, Clinton Ferrier, NOT GUILTY of Count
No. 4: POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA.

DATED this ML

day of December, A.D., 1996.

Foreperson
/& . 1996.
•J't-f &<**('"'{•* M**

Clerk

By:

Deputy

Addendum D

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County A t t o r n e y
P.

O.

BOX 8 5 0

OJI

Monticello, Utah
Phone 587-2128

FILED FPROC "">7
r t o i / * \^{

_,_

84535

CtERK OF THE COURT

BY.

Oeputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

•
*

vs.
CLINTON FERRIER,
Defendant(8)•

•

FINDINGS, JUDGMENT
AND COMMITMENT
Criminal No. 9617-43

#

THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 6TH
day of FEBRUARY, 1997, before the above entitled Court,

Craig C.

Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and.
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, William L.
Schultz
The Defendant was convicted by a jury to POSSESSION WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY.
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve
a term of One to Fifteen Years (1-15).
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State
Prison.

-2IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant*

Clerk of Jfche Court

